Published on: July 23, 2025

INDIA’S NUCLEAR POWER PROMISE

INDIA’S NUCLEAR POWER PROMISE

Introduction: Setting the Context

  • Union Budget 2025–26 targets 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047, a massive leap from the current 8.18 GW.

  • This aligns with India’s dual goals: Viksit Bharat @2047 and Net Zero emissions by 2070.

  • Emphasis on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) with ₹20,000 crore allocated—signifying a transformational shift.

Historical Evolution of India’s Nuclear Power

  • Early Leadership:

    • 1954: Homi Bhabha’s vision of 8 GW by 1980.

    • 1956: Apsara—Asia’s first research reactor.

    • 1963: Tarapur—Asia’s first commercial power reactor.

  • Setbacks and Isolation:

    • 1974: Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (Pokhran-I) led to sanctions.

    • India stayed out of the NPT (1968), faced export controls.

    • Targets deferred to 10 GW by 2000.

  • Indigenisation:

    • PHWR design developed indigenously (220 MW → 540 MW → 700 MW).

    • 700 MW reactors operational in Kakrapar by 2024.

Turning Point: Post-1998 Strategic Engagement

  • Nuclear acceptance after Pokhran-II and Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.

  • NSG waiver (2008) enabled fuel import and technology access.

  • Russia’s VVER reactors at Kudankulam remain the only international partnership.

The Case for Nuclear Energy in India’s Green Growth Agenda

  • Energy–GDP Nexus:

    • GDP must grow from $4 trillion to $35 trillion by 2047.

    • Per capita electricity use (1,208 kWh) far below China (4,600) and the U.S. (12,500).

    • 480 GW installed capacity must rise 5x; renewables are intermittent, fossil fuels are unsustainable.

  • Climate Commitments:

    • Net-zero by 2070, 50% energy from non-fossil sources by 2030.

    • Nuclear = baseload, low-carbon energy, vital for energy security.

  • COP28 Declaration and IAEA–World Bank collaboration reaffirm global nuclear revival.

Bottlenecks in Current Policy Framework

  • Atomic Energy Act, 1962:

    • Restricts nuclear operations to government entities.

    • NPCIL monopoly hinders private entry.

  • Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA), 2010:

    • Supplier liability deters foreign technology and investment.

    • Only Russia exempted via pre-CLNDA agreement.

  • Safety Oversight and Regulation:

    • AERB is autonomous but not legally independent.

    • Need for a statutory independent nuclear regulator.

  • Tariff Issues:

    • Tariffs under Atomic Energy Act, not Electricity Act.

    • NPCIL-GUVNL case underscores regulatory ambiguity.

Three-Pronged Strategy to Unlock Nuclear Potential

  • 1. Small Modular Reactors (SMRs):

    • Adapt 220 MW PHWR design to small-scale reactors.

    • Reduce commissioning time and costs.

    • Ideal replacement for 100+ GW of captive coal plants.

  • 2. Scaling 700 MW PHWR Fleet:

    • Facilitate land acquisition.

    • Strengthen indigenous supply chains.

    • Fast-track approvals.

  • 3. Reignite International Partnerships:

    • Accelerate negotiations with France (EDF) and U.S. (Westinghouse).

    • Stalled for over 15 years due to liability concerns.

Financing and Private Sector Role

  • High Capital Costs:

    • Nuclear: ~$2M/MW; Coal: <$1M/MW.

    • Lifecycle: 50–60 years + decommissioning + waste disposal.

  • NPCIL’s Budget Inadequate:

    • $1.2 billion annual cap is insufficient for 100 GW.

    • Need for private sector and FDI participation.

  • Ownership and Control Questions:

    • Who operates the reactor?

    • Who controls the “nuclear island”?

    • How is fuel supply and waste disposal assured?

Policy Reforms Needed

  • Amendments to Atomic Energy Act (1962):

    • Allow private/public sector JVs in nuclear projects.

    • Clarify roles, ownership, and safety accountability.

  • Revisit CLNDA (2010):

    • Redefine ‘supplier liability’ to align with global norms.

    • Encourage foreign OEM participation.

  • Tariff Rationalisation:

    • Bring nuclear tariffs under CERC and Electricity Act.

    • Use Levelised Cost of Energy (LCOE) for cross-sectoral parity.

  • Regulatory Reforms:

    • Enact law to create independent nuclear regulator.

    • Ensure transparency, credibility, and global acceptance.

Incentives and Enabling Conditions

  • Redefine Nuclear as “Green Energy”:

    • Enable access to green finance, carbon credits, tax breaks.

  • Viability Gap Funding (VGF):

    • Especially for first-of-its-kind SMRs.

  • Long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs):

    • De-risking strategy for private players.

  • FDI up to 49%:

    • Retains Indian control, attracts capital and tech.

Learning from Public Sector Experience

  • NTPC–NPCIL JV (Mahi Banswara):

    • Revival of 2011 partnership; 4×700 MW reactors.

    • Land acquisition under way; 7-year commissioning timeline.

  • REC Partnership Proposed:

    • Another public sector JV in the pipeline.

  • However, PSUs alone are insufficient to meet the 100 GW target.

Conclusion: Path to Redeeming the Nuclear Promise

  • Nuclear energy is India’s clean baseload bridge to economic prosperity.

  • Targets are feasible only through bold, comprehensive reforms.

  • The government must act decisively to:

    • Amend outdated laws,

    • Build enabling regulatory frameworks, and

    • Invite private and foreign players.

  • India’s nuclear promise will be fulfilled when it stops treating nuclear energy as a strategic reserve and starts leveraging it as a green growth engine.

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